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PELAKSANAAN TEKNIK BARU UNTUK PENGESANAN BERMAGNET 
PERANTI BAHAN LETUPAN BERMAGNET YANG DINAIK TARAF 
 
ABSTRAK 
Peranti Bermagnet Bahan Letupan yang Dinaik Taraf (IED) yang juga dikenali 
sebagai sejenis bom melekit adalah alat yang mudah dibina namun memberi kesan 
yang boleh membawa maut. Oleh itu, penyelidikan ini menekankan pengehadan bagi 
kaedah-kaedah yang telah dicadangkan untuk mengatasi ancaman ini dan bahayanya 
yang semakin meningkat dengan menunjukkan kekurangan persediaan eksperimentasi 
secara sistematik, ketiadaan nilai komersial selain kemungkinan yang tidak dapat 
dielakkan untuk merisikokan keselamatan kakitangan semasa mengendalikan 
beberapa sistem yang disebabkan oleh kekurangan automasi atau tidak menjadi mudah 
alih. Penyelidikan ini telah menyiasat satu pengesan bergred pengguna yang mampu 
mengesan satu medan bermagnet dalam ± 8 Gauss. Pengesan ini digunakan untuk 
mengesan magnet untuk meniru IED bermagnet. Magnet-magnet tersebut adalah dua 
bahan yang berlainan (berbeza dalam kekuatan ketumpatan medan magnet) dengan 
jumlah kiraan yang berbeza, dan ia telah digunakan untuk menghasilkan kemungkinan 
senario yang berbeza. Magnet-magnet tersebut adalah Neodimium dan Seramik 
dengan purata ketumpatan fluks masing-masing sebanyak 12,500 dan 2,500 Gauss. 
Tambahan pula, satu teknik baru telah dibangunkan dan dilaksanakan sebagai satu 
teknik pengujian sistematik yang praktikal berdasarkan kawasan eksperimen yang 
bergrid, yang mana ia adalah bersaiz sel individu yang sesuai dengan ancaman yang 
disifatkan. Teknik baru ini dinilai menggunakan pengesan dengan tujuan untuk 
meneroka sejauh mana kebolehannya untuk pengesanan IED bermagnet. Sebagai 
keputusannya, ia telah menghasilkan keputusan dalam bentuk yang mudah dikesan dan 
xv 
membuka jalan kepada analisis selanjutnya. Keputusan teknik baru ini telah 
mendedahkan bahawa kemungkinan pengesanan ancaman menggunakan pengesan 
yang digunakan bersama-sama dengan magnet di bawah kes-kes tertentu, di mana kes 
terburuk adalah ~ 181.4% kemungkinan pengesanan manakala kes terbaik adalah 
sehingga ~ 1666.7%, pada jarak 8.5 cm jauh dari pengesan. Walau bagaimanapun, 
bermula dari jarak 17 cm jauh dari pengesan dan seterusnya, bilangan nombor magnet 
yang berbeza dari dua bahan berbeza mula menyumbang secara berbeza kepada variasi 
bacaan. Nilai-nilai pembezaannya adalah serendah ~ 0.72% hingga ~ 2.1% pada jarak 
masing-masing 42.5 cm hingga 51 cm untuk bahan seramik, manakala bahan 
Neodimium adalah serendah ~ 2.3% dan 2.5% pada jarak masing–masing 59.5 cm dan 
42.5 cm. Akhirnya, penyelidikan ini akhirnya mencadangkan kebolehpasarannya 
berbanding dengan yang lain yang menjadikannya sebagai alasan kukuh untuk kajian 
masa hadapan yang berkaitan dengan pembangunan sistem pengesanan bermagnet 
IED yang melibatkan kos rendah dan mudah alih. 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW TECHNIQUE FOR MAGNETIC 
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DETECTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Magnetic Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), also commonly known 
as a type of a sticky bombs, are simply constructed devices yet very lethal. 
Consequently, this research highlights the limitations of methods that have been 
proposed to counteract this threat and its ever-increasing danger by indicating their 
lack of systematic experimentation setups, commercial unavailability in addition to the 
inevitable possibility of risking personnel safety while operating some systems due to 
lack of automation or being not portable. The research has investigated a consumer-
grade sensor that is capable of sensing a magnetic field ranging within ±8 Gauss. The 
sensor is employed for sensing magnets to mimic the magnetic IEDs. The magnets are 
of two different materials (contrasting in magnetic field density strength) with different 
counts, and they were used to develop different possibilities of scenarios. The magnets 
are Neodymium and Ceramic with an average flux density of 12,500 and 2,500 Gauss 
respectively. Furthermore, a new technique has been developed and implemented as a 
practical systematic testing technique based on gridded experimental area, which has 
an individual cell size corresponding to a characterized threat. This new technique is 
evaluated using the employed sensor with the purpose of exploring its extent of 
employability for Magnetic IEDs detection. As a result, it has allowed the 
representation of the results in a traceable manner and paved the way for further 
analysis. The results of the new technique have revealed that the chances of threat 
detection using the employed sensor in conjunction with magnets under defined cases, 
where the worst case there is a ~ 181.4% chance of detection whereas the best case it 
xvii 
could be as high as ~ 1666.7%, at a distance of 8.5 cm away from the sensor. However, 
starting from 17 cm distance from the sensor onwards, different number of magnets of 
the two different materials begins to contribute differently into readings variations. Its 
extent of distinguishability values is as low as ~ 0.72 % to ~ 2.1 % at a distance of 42.5 
cm to 51 cm respectively for Ceramic material, while the Neodymium material is as 
low as ~2.3% and 2.5% at a distance of 59.5 cm and 42.5 cm respectively. Finally, the 
research eventually recommended its employability in comparison with others laying 
the ground for future studies concerned with developing low-cost, portable Magnetic 
IEDs detection systems. 
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1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
In their harmless form, sticky devices, such as sticky containers or pads and 
many other more have been known to exist for more than a decade now associated 
with an increase of use. However, a nation will be dealing with different type of story 
during wartimes as it incites other types of “sticky” devices that may come to mind 
to one of ordinary skill in the art. 
Wartimes in general are hostiles to the nation’s environment putting 
everyone’s life at a high risk and endangerment. Such conditions generate an 
atmosphere of permissibility for hostile acts. Those acts come in many forms, but 
one threat in particular considered as one of the major causes of deaths and injuries 
among civilians in general, and has been systematically used against the brightest, 
most distinguished, and most highly regarded academics and scientists. 
The threat is known as the Magnetic IEDs (Improvised Explosives Devices) 
and they are often constructed from materials at hand. They are magnetically affixed 
bombs placed to vehicle    undercarriages    or    concealed locations.  Magnetic IEDs 
exterior are formed of a detonation circuitry in addition to strong magnets.  The 
purpose  of  using  magnets  with  such characteristics  is  to  make  sure  that  the 
Explosive  Device adheres firmly to the targeted vehicle. 
CHAPTER ONE 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
There are several problems in the methods implemented or proposed to 
counteract the threat that can be generally represented in the following points: 
 Personal safety
(Icove and Lyster, 2013) and (Icove, et al., 2014) employed a rather 
conventional detection techniques that requires the presence of an individual 
in order to inspect for the threat (not automated), which means the person is 
exposed to an imminent danger. 
 Commercial unavailability
Proceeding from the aforementioned point (Personal Safety) and its 
references, it is obvious that there is an additional costs incurred due to 
detection devices operation. Furthermore, the detection techniques offered 
implies inaccessibility for civilians, and therefore, they are deemed non-
commercial solutions. 
 Some detection systems limited to designated areas
Although some detection systems are stationary (not portable) or restricted to 
a certain area (e.g. fixed security checkpoints), the threat is not. Magnetic 
IEDs are easily concealed, they are considerably small and can be used 
anywhere at any time as long as the target is accessible. In fact, systems such 
as vehicle’s undercarriages checking system (UVIScan, 2016) and Fido XT 
Explosives Trace Detector (Ma and Bock, 2013) are designed to 
accommodate the needs of most explosives detection applications but it is 
only applicable at its designated areas. 
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 Inadequate or complete lack of systematic testing procedures
Research papers such as (Abid and Mustafa, 2012) using laser triangulation 
coupled with image processing detection technique or (Johnston, et al., 2010) 
that utilizes vehicle weight measurement comparisons based on tire pressure 
or magnetic field measurements lacked systematic steps to assist building a 
better illustrative understanding of sensors detection capabilities. 
To conclude, and based on the problem statements above, there is a need to for 
a practical systematic testing technique. This technique is evaluated using a 
consumer-grade magnetic sensor with the purpose of exploring its extent of 
employability for Magnetic IEDs detection. The research should eventually lay the 
ground for future studies concerned with developing low-cost, portable Magnetic 
IEDs detection systems. The stated points are further elaborated on under Chapter 2. 
1.3 Objectives 
I. To investigate the capability of a consumer-grade magnetic field sensing 
component to be applied for a new technique in Magnetic IED detection. 
II. To design, develop and implement the proposed magnetic IED detection
technique.
III. To characterize, evaluate and recommend the proposed technique of
Magnetic IED detection.
1.4 Contributions 
Magnetic IEDs are often constructed from materials at hand, therefore, and 
proceeding from that fact, the means to defeat this threat shouldn’t exceed that scope, 
thus the outcome should have impact on cost (in terms of reduction) and hopefully 
will incite automated (none human operated) systems to reduce human casualties. 
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In fact, this research not only offers an advantage in terms of portability in case 
of considering a security system that detects Magnetic IEDs employing such sensors, 
but also the fact that it paves the way for standardized tests using sensors of a similar 
type. 
The proposed technique aims to provide a systematic (gridded area based on a 
characterized threat) testing feasibility to enable detection area visualization and 
mathematical representation. Moreover, since the collected data is based on practical 
experimentations, then it can be considered for further investigations/feasibility of 
implementations. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
This research aims to establish a proper testing technique with the help of 
magnetic field sensing component and estimates detection range of a hypothetical 
Magnetic IEDs. Although the research covers practical work, it is still considered at 
fundamental stages due to several limitations. Those limitations can best be 
illustrated with the following points: 
I. The Magnetic IED Physical Dimensions 
Due to challenges in obtaining the actual magnetic IED which normally 
involving military agency, therefore, the physical dimensions of Magnetic 
IEDs either referenced to a source or concluded off a general observation. 
II. The Shape of Magnets
Magnets comes in many shapes, sizes and strengths, therefore, the
experiments conducted are based on magnets available at hand, however,
both of its material and size is defined so the results are limited to those
definitions.
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III. The Sensor’s Sensitivity
The sensor used is available commercially at an extremely low cost;
correspondingly, its performance is quite poor to a certain degree while its
sensing ability is limited to 2 milli-gauss field Resolution in ±8 Gauss Fields.
IV. Testing Ground
The initial area (space) dimension used for conducting the various
experiments is defined as a substitute for dealing with different vehicle sizes.
In this regard, the methodology chapter elaborates further on this matter.
1.6 Thesis summary 
The content of this thesis is presented in 5 chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
background of the topic discussed while defining the problems, objectives, 
contributions, scope and foreseen limitations. 
The second chapter is reviewing some theoretical or practical works that are either 
closely or directly related in addressing the topic of this thesis. Furthermore, the 
chapter highlights some of the important basics regarding the device(s)/materials 
used along with their characteristics. 
The third chapter concerns the methods, concepts and/or requirements and 
assumptions used to reach the final stages of obtaining the desired results, and in 
turn, the fourth chapter discusses in a greater detail those results with proper 
tabulations and graphical representations. 
Finally, the fifth chapter concluded the thesis by some conclusions and 
recommending some points that has potential to be considered for future works.  
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2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Wars, regardless of its claimed objectives or goals, have never benefited 
humanity in the long term even if the opposite is proven in the short term. That is 
attributed to the fact of its extreme destructive nature and being, more often than not, 
immoral. In fact, those characteristics oppose any progressive steps seeking to 
advance mankind.  
Few major recent wars had broken out in different regions of the world and, as usual, 
the civilians had the biggest share of the total casualties. However, what 
distinguishes modern-day wars is the fact that they have a great deal of 
documentation, through which researchers have been able to uncover a hidden 
agenda to target the future of the countries, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 serves as 
a good example.  
Amidst war’s aftermath, Iraqi academics have been exposed to numerous 
threats, which ranged from verbal insults inside the university campuses, beating, 
kidnapping to assassination (Majeed, 2010). In August 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of 
Higher Education released a staggering figure of fleeing academics, which reached 
more than 3,250 from the beginning of that same year (Ghosh, 2006), while 
according to the Iraqi Association of University Lecturers about 300 academics had 
been killed before early 2007 (Crain, 2007). Furthermore, the same association 
prepared a study in 2006 described the levels of fear experienced by the Iraqi 
CHAPTER TWO 
